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Abstract—In future inspections of offshore assets utilizing 
robots, robots will not only be expected to collate new data from 
their payload of instruments, but they will also be expected to 
interact with the infrastructure being inspected, undertaking 
remedial tasks and engaging with embedded monitoring systems 
of the asset. This increasing level of interaction and deployment 
frequency of robot inspections requires an understanding of how 
we can embed safe and trusted operational architectures within 
robots. Currently, robots can undertake constrained semi-
autonomous inspections, using predetermined tasks (missions) 
with minimum supervision. However, the challenge is that the 
state of the world changes with time as does the condition of the 
robot. Therefore, robots must be able to undertake adaptive 
measures to support optimal outcomes during autonomous 
missions. In this paper, we propose an initial architecture to the 
safe verification and validation of health condition and 
certification of robotic and autonomous inspection systems for 
offshore assets. Our first contribution relates to the verification 
and validation architecture, which takes into account risks 
associated with asset inspection, safety protocols, evolving 
ambient changes, as well as the inherent state of health of the 
robot. The second part of our paper looks to how prognostic 
analytics can be used to support robot resilience in terms of 
sensor drift and accurate state of health estimates of critical sub-
systems. Initial results demonstrate that methods such as 
relevance vector machines and Bayesian networks can be used to 
accurately mitigate risks to autonomy. 
Keywords— Robotic inspection; verification and validation; 
asset certification; prognostic and health management (PHM). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Robotic inspection systems are becoming increasingly 
popular in a wide range of industry sectors including: offshore 
energy, nuclear, space exploration, etc., to improve 
productivity, quality and safety [1]. Adoption of such systems 
aims to support inspection and latterly maintenance services in 
remote and/or hazardous environments with a view to reducing 
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, shortened diagnosis 
time, and improved health and safety for human inspectors. 
The Robot Institute of America (RIA) defines inspection 
robots as a mechanical-electrical integration system, involving 
structure, control, communication, positioning system, sensors, 
power source, etc. which is used for the inspection of material, 
parts, and products to detect either inherent defects (e.g. 
fractures or cracks) or service induced defects (e.g. damage 
from use). These robots range from underwater vehicles such 
as autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) and remotely 
operated underwater vehicles (ROVs), to airborne vehicles 
such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and drones [2, 3]. 
Figure 1 shows a typical ROV system and a drone that can be 
used for the inspection of subsea oil and gas assets and wind 
turbine nacelle components, respectively.  
 
 
 
(a)                                                 (b) 
Fig. 1. (a) Inspection ROV for subsea oil and gas assets (http://www.rov.org) 
(b) Inspection drones for wind turbine nacelle components 
(www.aerialmediascotland.co.uk). 
Reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM), which 
is defined as the probability of a system operating satisfactorily 
in any time period and its capability of being repaired, is a key 
performance indicator for robotic inspection systems. Any 
unforeseen robot stoppage may cause an interruption in the 
inspection process, or even lead to a fatality, serious injury, or 
damage to property, equipment or environment. To minimize 
the probability of these incidents and improve asset availability 
and lower maintenance costs, it is critical to develop 
methodologies that are capable of verifying and validating 
robotic and autonomous inspection systems by means of 
computer vision, machine learning (ML) algorithms, as well as 
health monitoring, diagnostics, prognostics, and maintenance 
(collectively known as Prognostics and Health Management 
(PHM)) tools. PHM has gained considerable attention within 
the robot system domain as it can help inspection decision-
makers increase the safety and reliability of robots while 
reducing their maintenance costs by providing accurate 
predictions concerning the remaining useful life (RUL) of 
critical components/systems.  
To address the challenges referenced above in asset and 
robot self-certification, the Offshore Robotics for Certification 
of Assets (ORCA) Hub (https://orcahub.org/) was established 
with the aim of bringing together internationally leading 
experts from five British universities (including: Heriot-Watt, 
Liverpool, Edinburgh, Oxford and Imperial College London) 
as well as more than thirty industry partners. This Engineering 
and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC) funded 
project will provide remote solutions using robotics and 
artificial intelligence (AI) that can operate and interact safely in 
autonomous or semi-autonomous modes in complex and 
cluttered environments such as subsea, ground and aerial. 
In this paper, an architecture is proposed for the safe 
verification and validation (V&V) of health condition and 
certification of robotic and autonomous inspection systems in 
the offshore energy sector. The proposed architecture takes into 
account risks associated with asset inspection, safety protocols, 
evolving ambient changes, as well as the inherent state of 
health of the robot. The second technical contribution relates to 
how prognostic and health management (PHM) methods can 
support assurance in the reliability of robot functionality and 
robot autonomy.  
The organisation of this paper is as follows. In Section II, 
an overview of the V&V process for robotic and autonomous 
inspection systems is provided. In Section III, the requirements 
for the implementation of PHM for inspection robots in the 
offshore sector are described. In Section IV, case studies are 
presented to demonstrate the certification process of a robot 
and the role of prognostic analytics in supporting robot’s 
reliability and safety. The use of Bayesian inference is also 
discussed to demonstrate how sensor drift, leading to a 
misrepresentation of the world to the robot, can be overcome. 
Finally, in Section V, we conclude this study with a brief 
discussion on topics for future research. 
II. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION PROCESS FOR 
ROBOTIC AND AUTONOMOUS INSPECTION SYSTEMS 
A. Autonomy 
By ‘autonomy’, we mean the ability of a system to make its 
own decisions and to act on its own, and to do both without 
direct human intervention. This general definition covers a 
range of variations from automatic, wherein decisions/activities 
are fixed in advance, through adaptive, wherein 
decisions/activities are optimised with respect to (and driven 
by) the environment, and on to autonomous, wherein 
decisions/activities can include internal motivations/beliefs 
allowing the system to not only be driven by its environment. 
An additional dimension is the role that the human operator 
plays in making key decisions and taking key actions. Again 
this can range from the whole activity being undertaken by the 
operator, through remote control, to selection of options by the 
operator or to full autonomy where the operator sets general 
goals/guidance but the system actually decides how, when and 
where to act. There are a variety of such categorisations, an 
important one developed for aerospace being the Pilot 
Authority and Control of Tasks (PACT) categorisation [4]. As 
responsibility for the robot’s decisions and certification lies 
with humans in less autonomous varieties, we are primarily 
concerned with how systems with high levels of autonomy can 
be handled. 
B. Regulation and certification 
In developing new systems for use in practical 
environments, each authority will have rules, policies and laws 
to ensure the safe design and operation of systems, i.e. 
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regulations. This then leads to certification, namely checking 
whether the systems in question comply with the relevant 
regulations. Note that this primarily is a legal, rather than 
scientific, assessment and usually involves external review, 
typically by some regulators. Note also that, once a system is 
certified, it does not guarantee it is safe – it just guarantees that, 
legally, it can be considered “safe enough” and that the risk is 
considered acceptable. 
Certification processes and regulators which are documents 
(usually produced by a panel of experts) provide guidance on 
the proving of compliance. In the case of robotic systems there 
are many standards that might be deemed relevant by 
regulators. From general safety standards, such as ISO 61508, 
through domain specific standards such as ISO 10218 
(industrial robots), ISO 15066 (collaborative robots), or RTCA 
DO-178B/C (aerospace), and even on to ethical aspects 
(BS8611). 
While there are very many such approaches, regulators and 
standards almost uniformly ignore the issue of autonomy, 
particularly full autonomy wherein systems take crucial, safety 
critical, decisions on their own. Standards/regulations have 
little to say about intelligent software that make complex 
decisions about safety/ethics, yet this is a fundamental part of 
(semi) autonomous robotic systems. With these issues, and 
particularly where robotic systems need to carry out self-
certification, it is clear that greater autonomy needs stronger 
V&V techniques. 
C. Verification and validation 
The aim of verification is to ensure that a system matches 
its requirements. These requirements may be informal, in 
which case it is hard to assess if, or how, our system does 
indeed correspond to them, or the requirements may be 
explicitly formal. The formal variety is often given in a clear, 
precise language with unambiguous semantics. Formal 
verification takes this further, not only having precise formal 
requirements in a mathematical form, but carrying out a 
comprehensive mathematical analysis of the system to ‘prove’ 
whether it corresponds to the formal specification of these 
requirements. Formal verification is particularly used for 
systems that are safety, business, or mission critical, and where 
errors can have severe consequences. Indeed, some of the 
aforementioned standards prescribe such formal methods, since 
informal verification techniques such as testing have little 
certainty in their results. 
There are many varieties of formal verification, the most 
widespread being model checking [5], whereby the formal 
specification is checked (usually automatically) against all 
possible executions of the system. Verification, via model 
checking, is widely used especially for the analysis of critical 
systems. However, its use in autonomous software is relatively 
recent [6], while application to the verification of practical 
autonomous systems is still at a very early stage [7, 8]. Though 
these approaches are typically used before deployment, related 
techniques provide the basis for run-time monitoring and 
compliance testing. Such run-time verification [RosuH05] is 
important in assessing how complex systems evolve, and 
ensuring that unacceptable behaviours are detected and 
mitigated. 
Validation is the process of confirming that the final system 
has the intended behaviour once it is active in its target 
environment, and is often concerned with satisfying external 
stakeholders. For example, does our system match safety 
standards or legal rules set by regulators? Does our system 
perform acceptably from a customer’s point of view, and how 
well do users feel that it works? The are many approaches to 
carrying out validation, incorporating diverse aspects, but 
typically involving the assessment of accuracy, repeatability, 
usability, resilience, etc. 
In our context, V&V necessitates a range of techniques, 
from formal safety verification, through testing, to in-situ 
evaluation and monitoring, and it is often difficult to delineate 
these phases. For example, since autonomous robotic systems 
typically interact with the “real world”, we must ensure that 
verification is extended to this interaction. Yet it is impossible 
to accurately model the real-world, with its uncertain and 
continuous dynamics, in a finite way and so exploration of all 
possibilities via techniques such as model-checking is 
infeasible. This leads to several options. such as abstraction, 
testing, and monitoring. We can try to abstract from the 
complexity of the real world and provide a finite description of 
this abstraction that we can then use in formal verification; this 
abstraction is likely to be incorrect in some way and will need 
refinement. A practical alternative is to use sophisticated 
testing methods, appealing to Monte-Carlo techniques and 
dynamic test refinement in order to systematically ‘cover’ a 
wide range of practical situations. Such requirements-based 
testing is widely used in electronic systems design. A further 
option is to monitor the system as it runs, detecting if it ever 
performs unacceptable behaviour. 
D. Hybrid agent architecture and internal models 
In order to capture (and control) higher levels of autonomy, 
we utilise a modular architecture with a distinguished 
agent/executive taking the high-level decisions [9, 10]. Note 
that this agent not only takes critical decisions but, crucially, is 
able to explain and justify its decisions. In addition, the agent   
controls lower-level components (and their organisation). As 
well as being transparent in terms of high-level decision-
making, the architecture exposes the behaviour of sub-modules 
within the system. This approach has been used to construct 
and verify a range of different autonomous systems, such as 
satellites [7], road convoys [9], and ethical decisions [11]. 
Within the robotic architecture we also have four models: 
1. An interaction model, used to capture modes and 
preferences in user interaction; 
2. A self-model, wherein the robot has a dynamic description 
of the (expected) behaviour of its own system components; 
3. A task model, capturing the set of tasks/goals (including 
timing/resource constraints) that the robot must undertake 
(for example, inspection activities); and 
4. A safety model [12], capturing the safety considerations 
identified in initial certification. 
We will not consider (1) here but note that (2) and (4) (the 
self and safety models) are vital for self-certification. The 
former helps identify changes in robot capability, while the 
latter delimits issues that go beyond the bounds identified in 
the original certification process. Furthermore, (3) and (4) (the 
task and safety models) are central to carrying out safe and 
reliable inspection of external assets. The task model will 
capture the required inspections and actions that characterise 
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effective asset certification, while the safety model again 
ensures that this is carried out safely. All of these aspects can 
potentially be verified to ensure correctness and conformity to 
certification expectations. 
III. PROGNOSTIC & HEALTH MANAGEMENT FOR 
ROBOTIC AND AUTONOMOUS INSPECTION SYSTEMS 
Robots and autonomous systems are playing an 
increasingly important role in the inspection and maintenance 
operations of critical assets in remote locations and/or harsh 
environments. The growing demand for improving the 
reliability, survivability and overall success of robot supported 
missions, has led to an increased emphasis on robot safety and 
reliability. In this Section, the principles of Prognostics and 
Health Management (PHM) in robotic inspection are 
introduced, its specific requirements are described and the 
steps for implementation of the PHM are described in detail. 
A. PHM principals in robotic inspection 
PHM is an approach to the system life-cycle support that 
seeks to prevent unforeseen stoppages through accurate 
monitoring, incipient fault detection, and prediction of 
impending faults [13]. This approach has been an emerging 
discipline to scientifically manage the health condition of 
robotic systems and their critical components. The PHM aims 
at developing measurement tools to promote the design, test, 
V&V of inspection technology for robot systems. 
An inspection robot is a complex system consisting of 
several interacting components including robot arms, sensors, 
control systems, end-effectors, process tooling, power supplies, 
and software. To successfully perform a task, the robot system 
needs to deliver the position and orientation accuracy of the 
tool centre position (TCP), the trajectory of the arm, the correct 
speed, force, and torque. The constituent sub-systems and 
components of an inspection robot degrade with use in harsh 
conditions [14]. The degradation of a robot system can lead to 
a decrease in inspection quality (e.g. in terms of probability of 
detection of a defect) and efficiency (e.g. in terms of duration 
and cost). One of the objectives of PHM systems in robotic 
inspection is to predict RUL of the robot system or its 
individual components as they degrade from an initial state to a 
failure state. 
The RUL prediction is regarded as one of the key issues in 
PHM and it is generally defined as the time interval during 
which the asset’s performance satisfies certain qualitative 
criteria. The RUL of an industrial robot can be predicted by 
extrapolating degradation patterns and by using three main 
approaches, namely model-based, data-driven and fusion-based 
(integration of model and data driven) approaches. The model-
based approach is typically based on the utilization of physics 
of failure models of the degradation, while the data-driven 
approach is based on the transformation of the degradation data 
provided by the sensors into models that represent the pattern 
of the degradation. Figure 2 depicts an RUL prediction strategy 
for a robot system based on a pattern extracted from the 
observed degradation data. 
 
Fig. 2. RUL prediction model for a robot system based on the actual 
degradation data. 
By prediction of the RUL, a plan for calibration and 
preventive maintenance of robot components and control 
equipment can be optimised. Furthermore, the insight provided 
by the RUL prediction model informs Design for Reliability 
(DFR) for next-generation robots. 
B. PHM requirements for inspection robots 
The application of PHM to inspection robots differs from 
that of traditional applications of PHM, such as simple rotating 
machinery. The use of PHM in robotic inspection systems 
brings new challenges to both uncertainty management and 
false alarm mitigation. There have been several recent 
advances for inspection robots to enhance their sensing, 
computing and fault simulation capabilities for hosting PHM 
functions. However, there are still several requirements needed 
to be fulfilled to increase the capability of PHM for inspection 
robots. 
The PHM can be applied to inspection robots through the 
development of reference datasets, testing technologies, and 
analytics supporting tools (see Figure 3). Modern robotic and 
autonomous inspection systems are equipped with a variety of 
sensors, where each one monitors a part of the system’s state. 
As a result, historical operational data from real-world systems 
are abundant. However, the majority of the data samples often 
belong to the healthy region of robots’ operation, long before 
complete failure. Consequently, healthy and faulty data 
samples are not equally represented in the reference datasets, 
leading to a skewed dataset. 
 
Fig. 3. The key requirements for the application of PHM to robotic 
inspection. 
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Over the past years, various analytical approaches have 
been proposed to support PHM of the robotic and autonomous 
systems. These tools deal effectively with high dimensional 
data, abstracting the important information, helping as such the 
user to extract the meaningful part of the data. Among these 
approaches, machine learning (ML) has been shown to be 
theoretically sound, generically applicable and demonstrating 
promising results especially on applications where online 
prognosis is required. Broadly, there are three types of ML 
algorithms [15]: 
(i) Supervised learning algorithms in which a target variable 
(dependent variable) is predicted from a given set of predictors 
(independent variables). In other words, a function is generated 
to map inputs to desired outputs using a set of variables. The 
training process continues until the model achieves a desired 
level of accuracy on the training data. Examples of such 
algorithms include regression, decision tree, random forest, k-
nearest neighbours, logistic regression, etc. 
(ii) Unsupervised learning algorithms in which no target or 
outcome variable is predicted but it is used for clustering the 
assets or failure modes in different groups for specific 
intervention. Examples of such algorithms are Apriori 
algorithm and K-means. 
(iii) Reinforcement learning algorithms through which the 
robot is exposed to an environment where it trains itself 
continually using trial and error to capture the best possible 
knowledge to make accurate inspection decisions. An example 
of such an approach are Markov decision processes (MDPs). 
Bayesian methods have been widely used for reinforcement 
learning, yielding principled methods for incorporating prior 
information into the robot’s learning process [16]. A Bayesian 
Network (BN) is a graphical representation of conditional 
dependencies between a set of random variables. In other 
words, a BN is used to decompose the joint probability of a set 
of random variables (i.e., variables that are sampled from a 
probability distribution) to a product of simpler factors, 
exploiting the conditional dependences of the latter. A special 
case of BNs is that of Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs). 
DBNs relate random variables at different instances in time. 
Assuming that X = {xi} and Y = {yi}, i=1,…,k, the joint 
probability of all states and observations across time is written 
as follows: 
𝑃(𝑋, 𝑌) =  ∏𝑃(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) 
⏞    
𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒
∏𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝑥𝑖−1)⏟    
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑃(𝑥0) 
                                     
(1) 
 
Given the joint probability distribution, any query 
combination can be answered by setting the variables that 
represent the observations and marginalising (summing over all 
possible events) the variables that are neither evidence nor 
query variables. Marginalisation is what hinders efficient 
computation of the queries, sometimes making them even 
computationally intractable. To this end, several algorithms 
have been developed both for answering the exact question or 
an approximate one, i.e., exact and approximate inference 
respectively [17, 18]. 
C. Implementation of PHM in robotic inspection 
PHM can be applied to both the infrastructure being 
inspected and the robot that is used to support inspection 
services. PHM for infrastructure asset management has been 
extensively addressed in the past decade and several 
methodologies for implementation were presented, such as V-
diagram, WEAR methodology, etc. A circular methodology to 
implement PHM in robotic inspection is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Steps for implementation of PHM in asset management. 
PHM for robotic inspection systems can be implemented in 
two levels: the robot system level and robot component level. 
Robot level PHM assesses the health of the overall system by 
taking into account its architecture, function, and field-related 
parameters (such as depth of water in which the ROV 
operates). Component level PHM is typically focused on 
monitoring the health of individual components (e.g., arms, 
sensors and electronic devices) to determine if the health of the 
monitored component is degraded. 
The key building blocks of the PHM for an inspection 
smart pig are shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Key elements of the PHM for an inspection smart pig. 
As can be seen, the first key building block is the 
advanced sensing module for PHM (shown in the upper left of 
Figure 5). Advanced sensing technologies are developed to 
measure and monitor the robot’s health status, with three 
sensing layers: a system layer, a component layer, and an add-
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on layer [13]. The system layer aims to support the overall 
system’s health assessment, including repeatability, accuracy, 
velocity, force, and torque; the component layer extracts data 
from the robots’ controllers and/or embedded sensors to 
perform the on-line monitoring; the add-on layer promotes the 
inclusion of additional sensors to provide information that the 
component and system layers may be neglecting. The second 
key building block is the data processing module. This module 
will focus on the development of reference algorithms to fuse 
data captured from multiple sensors employed in the advanced 
sensing module. The third key building block is the 
development of algorithms for robot system health assessment 
and PHM V&V methods. 
The PHM model accuracy depends on the robust 
prediction of the system’s state and its RUL. Moreover, the 
system’s model needs to be adaptive, to account for variance 
in dynamic parameters, as well as for diverse operating 
conditions. To accomplish that, locally weighted projection 
regression (LWPR) can be used, given part of the state history 
and the current input.  
𝑦𝑛 = 𝑓(𝑦𝑛−𝑘 ∶ 𝑛−1, 𝑢𝑛−𝑚 ∶ 𝑛−1)                        (2) 
Equation (2) describes the general case of an Auto-
Regressive model with Exogenous inputs (ARX). In typical 
ARX models f (. , .) is a polynomial of the inputs and the 
previous states of the system.  
In the following Section, case studies are used to 
demonstrate the role of prognostic analytics in supporting 
robot reliability and safety. 
IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. A robot’s lithium-ion battery 
The majority of autonomous robots utilise a battery power 
supply, typically a Lithium-ion battery. Although these 
batteries are rechargeable, cell-aging caused by irreversible 
chemical reactions during usage leads to reduction in capacity 
overtime. Therefore, how the robot is used will affect the depth 
of discharge which has a distinct influence on battery RUL. As 
a critical sub-system within the robot, the state of health of the 
lithium-ion battery needs to be monitored during operation in 
order to help assure safe robot operation, functionality and 
reliability. Andoni et al. [19] applied a Relevance Vector 
Machine (RVM) technique which was a Bayesian treatment of 
support vector machine for battery’s RUL prediction. The 
Bayesian treatment led to probabilistic predictions and allowed 
arbitrary kernel functions to be utilised. In the study, an 
iterative expectation–maximization (EM) algorithm for RVM 
training was implemented. The EM algorithm can directly 
avoid the step of optimizing hyperparameters.  
 The battery data used to conduct this experiment are 
obtained from the open-source, life cycle test data repository of 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
Ames Prognostics Centre of Excellence (PCoE). To measure 
the RUL prediction error of the algorithm, we define error AE 
and relative error RE as:  
𝐴𝐸 = ‖𝑅 − ?̌?‖ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝐸 = 
‖𝑅 − ?̌?‖
𝑅
 
                          (3) 
where R and Ř represent the actual and the predicted RUL 
values, respectively. These values are shown in Figure 6.    
 
Figure 6. Real data (blue) and predicted (green) remaining useful life estimates 
based on 40 learning cycles. 
In terms of sensing, all autonomous agents are equipped 
with various sensors that measure physical quantities of 
interest. The information from the sensors is used to yield an 
estimation of the state of the world; specifically, the part of the 
world that is relevant to a prescribed task (mission). Based on 
this estimation, the autonomous agent deliberates how to 
proceed towards mission completion. Next, the result of this 
deliberative process, namely the “plan”, is executed. 
In most applications the environment is dynamic; i.e., the 
operational conditions are subject to change without prior 
notice. In this case, the agent needs to adapt the original plan to 
account for the new condition. However, the agent may receive 
erroneous data that leads to a misrepresentation of the world 
around it due to sensor drift or failure. Long-term autonomy 
entails sophisticated inference mechanisms to cope with the 
dynamic traits of a real-world environment. It is of profound 
importance to ensure that inference, as described above, is 
based on accurate information. To accommodate sensor drift 
and failure, Fagogenis [16] implemented an incremental kernel 
regression for dynamic modelling. Algorithms of this sort are 
easy to train and are highly adaptive. Adaptivity allows for 
model adjustments, whenever the environment of operation 
changes. Bayesian reasoning provides a rigorous framework 
for addressing uncertainty. Moreover, using Bayesian 
Networks, complex inference regarding hardware degradation 
can be answered. Specifically, adaptive modelling is combined 
with Bayesian reasoning to yield recursive estimation 
algorithms that are robust to sensor failures. In this work, two 
solutions are presented by extending the existing recursive 
estimation algorithms from robotics literature. The algorithms 
are deployed on an underwater vehicle and the performance is 
assessed in real-world experiments. A comparison against 
standard filters is also provided. Next, the previous algorithms 
are extended to consider sensor and actuator failures jointly. 
An algorithm that can detect thruster failures in an AUV has 
been developed. Moreover, the algorithm adapts the dynamic 
model online to compensate for the detected fault. The 
performance of this algorithm was also tested in a real-world 
application. One step further than hardware fault detection, 
prognostics predict how much longer can a particular hardware 
component operate normally. Ubiquitous sensors in modern 
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systems render data-driven prognostics a viable solution. 
However, training is based on skewed datasets; datasets where 
the samples from the faulty region of operation are much fewer 
than the ones from the healthy region of operation. A 
prognostic algorithm that tackles the problem of imbalanced 
(skewed) datasets is developed through the implementation of 
RAS boosting and linear regression analysis. 
B. Certification of UAVs 
One of the key components of any autonomous robotic 
system is the decision-making system, which makes decisions 
based upon what is being sensed around and within the robot. 
If the robot is part of, or is, a safety critical system, 
demonstrating that the robot is ‘safe enough’ through physical 
testing is likely to be impractical. This issue was addressed at 
for an unmanned aerial system [20]. Here, the pilot was 
replaced by a rational agent with the agent being programmed 
to follow a small number of key Rules of the Air [21]. A 
simulation environment was created that linked high-fidelity 
multi-body flight dynamics models with rational agents 
performing pilotage and air traffic control functions as well as 
a route planner and a visualisation engine [22]. The subsequent 
mission simulations were then able to be run in real-time or, 
using co-located high performance computing facilities, faster 
than real time.  
The advantage of using a rational agent is that it can be 
programmed in a way that allows the logic within it to be 
formally verified using a formal method called model 
checking [20]. The Rules of the Air have been developed over 
at least 100 years of manned flight (and are based upon the 
Rules of the Sea, developed over an even longer timescale) and 
so can be inconsistent. Two specific rules were included in the 
agent that are, by inspection, in conflict with one another. The 
model checking process was able to detect this conflict and the 
decision-making logic was modified accordingly. 
In real time, the efficacy of the rational agent acting as pilot 
was able to be assessed through a simulated flight from 
Aberporth to Sumburgh in the UK. A hazardous situation was 
introduced whereby a second aircraft was introduced into the 
environment on a flightpath that would, if no action were 
taken, result in a head-on collision. It could then be 
demonstrated that the agent correctly turned the aircraft to the 
right to avoid the oncoming intruder aircraft.  
The detection of the intruder aircraft, of course, relied upon 
the sensor models within the simulation.  An added benefit of 
using the simulation environment is that the sensor model can 
be up- or down-graded at will. Using high-performance 
computing facilities, thousands of simulations can be run with 
different effective sensor ranges (for example). In this way, it 
was possible to determine the sensor range and flight 
conditions for which the system would no longer be able to 
maintain a pre-defined safe separation distance from the 
intruder aircraft.  
The case study briefly described above showed that the 
coupling of formal verification methods and traditional 
engineering modelling, simulation and testing can provide a 
powerful means either to generate evidence that the operation 
of a robotic system (in this case, an unmanned aircraft) can be 
achieved as required, or, to show under what conditions it 
would not. We combine two strands of existing work. The first 
is the simulation environment described above for UAV 
certification evidence; the second is work carried out on the 
simulation of ship air wakes, with a particular interest in 
manned helicopter operations [23]. Ship air wakes are 
generated using computational fluid dynamics techniques and 
introduced into the multi-block flight dynamics models as air 
flow perturbations. The aim of this work is to be able to 
perform initial helicopter-ship trials in simulation such that the 
overall cost of such trials can be reduced. 
In the context of the offshore case, to achieve a particular 
inspection mission, the UAV rational agent pilot must plan a 
safe route through a potentially turbulent environment. 
Unwanted collisions with the offshore platform and any other 
vehicles must be avoided, whilst ensuring that the UAV only 
enters areas of disturbed air flow for which it has sufficient 
control power and disturbance rejection capability. Figure 7 
illustrates this for two offshore asset cases. In the lee of the oil 
rig, there will be a wake, which is dependent on the geometry, 
wind speed, wind direction, sea state, and (if the oil rig is a 
floating one) the motion of the platform. For the wind turbine 
case, the blade tip vortices create a rotating flow structure of 
vortices, which forms in a helix in the lee of the turbine. This 
wake is dependent on the geometry of the turbine, wind speed, 
wind direction, and turbine speed. For both cases, the wake 
dissipates as it travels downstream of the structure, which 
means that the hazard presented by these flow structures 
reduces with the distance from the structure. 
 
(a)                                                         (b) 
Figure 7. (a) Factors when operating around an oil rig (b) Factors when 
operating around a wind turbine (only one vortex core shown for clarity) 
Pilots currently avoid this problem by following simple 
rules, such as separation distances and times. However, these 
are unlikely to be applicable or helpful for this mode of 
operations. The challenge when operating in these 
environments will be to provide the UAV with the internal risk 
model that allows it to know where the dangerous areas are and 
integrating that information into its path planning and 
monitoring functions. Such models form part of both the 
system’s safety model and its task model, as described above. 
If the systematic testing and verification of the autonomous 
system and the simulation of the interaction between wakes 
and aircraft can be combined, then this will allow a simulation 
system to be built that will allow both the decision-making 
elements and the engineering components of the system to be 
tested to generate evidence to regulators to allow them to be 
confident that a given operation/mission is ‘safe enough’. 
Due to the high computational requirements the above risk 
model cannot feasibly be recomputed on-board the inspection 
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vehicle. Instead, the model will contain broad risk maps, pre-
computed for a range of different wind speed/directions and 
structures. These are then used as part of the system’s safety 
model and its task model; the former to ensure that the vehicle 
remains safe in its environment, the latter to ensure that risk of 
damage is taken into account when planning inspection routes. 
This then brings the two threads together: a ‘safe’ 
autonomous vehicle, based on a broad risk model; with 
prognostics and asset inspections that it must carry out, taking 
into account safe operations. This is clearly a cyclic process – 
the result of inspection and prognostic procedures will input to 
the rational agent’s decisions about how important it is that 
various structures be inspected, and also how much `risk’ is 
acceptable. The potential for verifiability of all these 
components is crucial in ensuring that these important systems 
remain within acceptable bounds. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Global investment in robots to support inspection services 
in remote locations and/or hazardous environments is driven by 
factors such as the reduction in operation and maintenance 
(O&M) costs, minimizing breakdown time, and eliminating 
risks to humans and hazards to assets. The adoption of robotics 
into many spheres of life, especially when interacting with 
critical assets, will be dependent on the safe and trusted 
inspection. In this paper, we present an architecture for the safe 
verification and validation (V&V) of health condition and 
certification of robotic and autonomous inspection systems in 
the offshore energy sector. A number of PHM analytics tools 
including Machine Learning (ML) techniques such as kernel 
regression for dynamic modelling when the environment of 
operation changes, or the Bayesian reasoning to provide a 
rigorous framework for addressing uncertainty were briefly 
introduced. In addition, Bayesian Networks (BNs) were 
explained to provide complex inference regarding hardware 
degradation. Finally, it was discussed how Relevance Vector 
Machines were used to provide accurate predictions of the 
remaining useful lifetime (RUL) of robotic assets. Our future 
research will explore the role of online probabilistic modelling 
and the role of self-learning systems in autonomous operations. 
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